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Abstract. The publication of Heidegger’s Black Notebooks (Schwarze Hefte) has provoked a storm of con-
troversy. Much of this has centred on the pro-Nazi and anti-Semitic comments the volumes contain. But these
aspects of the Notebooks are perhaps the least surprising and important. This essay offers a summary overview
of the issues to which the Notebooks give rise, at the same time as it also aims to provide a preliminary assess-
ment of their overall significance, especially in relation to what they show about the nature and development of
Heidegger’s thinking from the early 1930s to the late 1940s.
For much of his life, and certainly from the 1930s on-
wards, Martin Heidegger kept a series of black-bound note-
books in which he recorded ideas and observations. Known
as the Black Notebooks (Schwarze Hefte), the material they
contained was periodically edited by Heidegger, and he gave
different titles to different volumes and sets of volumes.
Of those so far published, the first three collected volumes
are the Considerations (Überlegungen; see Heidegger, 2016,
2017)1, which run from 1931 to 1942 (though the first vol-
ume from 1931 is lost, destroyed by Heidegger himself), and
the second are the Remarks (Anmerkungen), running from
1942 to 1949 (published in the Heidegger Gesamtausgabe as
Heidegger, 2014a, b, c, 2015). Further volumes are to be pub-
lished over the coming years (and the next volume is, in fact,
already close to being ready for publication). The contents
of the Notebooks are quite varied: they include philosoph-
ical ideas and commentary, but they also include personal
observations and ruminations, and remarks on contemporary
events. In contrast with public works from the same period,
the Notebooks are relatively unrestrained, they contain many
instances of dismissive irony or sarcasm, and, in the 1930s
1The English edition of these volumes forsakes the straightfor-
wardness of “Considerations” for the rather more laboured “Ponder-
ings” (seemingly with no sense of the awkwardness and pomposity
to which such a translation gives rise).
and early 1940s especially, they are frequently suffused with
a degree of anger and even bitterness. The form of the Note-
books echoes that of Nietzsche’s Nachlass (see Babich, 2016;
see also Krell, 2015), and clearly Heidegger treated the Note-
books not merely as a writing tool for his own personal use
but as literary works of a certain type and character and as
having a very particular role and position within the larger
body of his work. They do not stand on their own, however,
and it would be a serious mistake to suppose that one could
read the Notebooks in any serious fashion independently of
the rest of Heidegger’s writings.
Since the publication of the first of the Notebooks in 2014,
the volumes have provoked a storm of controversy, with
many readers taking them to prove what they assume to
be already evident, namely Heidegger’s reprehensible moral
and political character (see, for instance, Wolin, 2014). It
is certainly true that the Notebooks contain many state-
ments that, from a contemporary perspective, are beyond the
pale. Not unsurprisingly, given what we know from other
sources about Heidegger’s involvement in the Nazi Party in
the early 1930s, the volumes from those years contain ex-
amples of Heidegger’s seeming intoxication with the Na-
tional Socialist Revolution and his enthusiasm for its leader,
Adolf Hitler. What the Notebooks also show, however, is
the extent to which Heidegger’s support for National Social-
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ism rapidly turned sour, and the strength of that initial sup-
port was transformed into an antagonism directed not only
at the Nazis but also at Christianity, Catholicism, Bolshe-
vism, Americanism, modernity, science, and what he calls
“world Jewry” (Weltjudentum). The passages from the Note-
books that have provoked most controversy are, in fact, those
anti-Semitic passages that actually come from the period af-
ter Heidegger’s break with Nazism (no such passages are to
be found in the volumes prior to around 1938) – passages
in which Heidegger seems almost to repeat a fairly crude
stereotypical-seeming contradiction of his own injunctions
elsewhere against exactly such bigotry and racialism.
Although it does not diminish their distressing or repre-
hensible nature, the anti-Semitic passages in the Notebooks
are concentrated in only a few places, all of them, as noted
above, after 1939, and anti-Semitism is not itself a recurrent
or major theme in the Notebooks overall (one might argue,
in fact, that the manner of its appearance suggests that it is
almost something taken for granted, so that it is treated as
barely even worthy of comment either for or against). The
most powerful strands in the Notebooks from the 1930s and
into the 1940 are actually tied to the shifts in Heidegger’s
thinking that occur after the “failure” of Being and Time
(Heidegger’s own failure to complete the project originally
envisaged there and the failure evident in the many misinter-
pretations the work engendered) (see Thomä, 2005) and after
the failed political engagement of the early 1930s. It is these
shifts that underlie what has often been referred to as the
Kehre or Wendung, the “turning”, in Heidegger’s thought2
and are brought to a special focus in his major volume from
the 1930s, withheld from publication at the time, the Con-
tributions to Philosophy (Beiträge zur Philosophie), written
between 1936 and 1938.
The reorientation in thinking that is associated with these
shifts is complex, not always consistent, and takes place over
more than a decade and a half – from 1930 until 1946; it
is a reorientation that encompasses, but does not end with,
Contributions, even though that volume plays a pivotal part
in it. The fact that the Notebooks from the 1930s and 1940s
do indeed belong to such a period of reorientation, and that
they reflect the attempts at such reorientation, ought to be a
simple and obvious point – one that is underscored by the
fact that the Notebooks, as we have them, begin in 1931, in
other words, at around the time that Heidegger himself iden-
tified as the starting point for the new direction in his think-
ing after Being and Time.3 Yet simple and obvious though
it ought to be, it is a point to which attention is seldom ex-
2I leave to one side the issue as to whether these terms can both
be used to refer to the shift in Heidegger’s thinking in the 1930s and
1940s. Thomas Sheehan, of course, has famously argued that they
cannot (see, for instance, Sheehan, 2001).
3See Heidegger’s comments in “Letter on ‘Humanism”’ (Hei-
degger, 1998:249–250). There Heidegger identifies the essay “On
the Essence of Truth”, delivered in 1930 but not published until
plicitly drawn. The period covered by the first four collected
volumes of the Notebooks – from 1931 to 1948 – is a pe-
riod not only of historical turmoil for Germany and for the
world but also of personal and philosophical turmoil for Hei-
degger himself. It is thus no surprise that there is a sense of
struggle (Kampf) that permeates the Notebooks (see Vallega-
Neu, 2016) and that, one might add, is also present in many
other works from the same period (especially those that re-
mained unpublished at the time). In this respect, just as it
would be a mistake to treat Contributions (or Being and Time
for that matter) as containing the definitive statement of Hei-
degger’s thinking, so it would also be an even greater mistake
to try to read the Notebooks as if they expressed a single, set-
tled, philosophical viewpoint. Indeed, even though, a decade
later, Heidegger refers to 1936 as a watershed year for the
development of his thought – a point at which he had a clear
glimpse of the proper place to which it belonged (the Con-
tributions issuing from this) – he nevertheless also talks of a
“many-turning journeying [Wanderschaft]” within that very
same place, and the difficulties (“aberrations [Irrgänge] and
attempts [Versuche]”) encountered along the way (Heideg-
ger, 2015, p. 191).
Yet in spite of the shifts that Heidegger’s thinking under-
goes in the 1930s and early 1940s, and in spite of his later
acknowledgement of those shifts, there is little sign of uncer-
tainty or self-doubt in the relevant Notebooks or in other writ-
ings from that same period. Before 1934, the entries in the
Notebooks show Heidegger’s exuberant enthusiasm for the
National Socialist “revolution” and the possibility, as Hei-
degger saw it, of giving political reality to his own philo-
sophical ideas. After 1934, the political enthusiasm vanished,
but the revolutionary zeal remained, now transformed into a
singularly and resolutely philosophical mission. In the Note-
books, the failure of the rectorate itself appears not so much
as Heidegger’s failure but as a failure of the time and of the
university:
The end of my rectorate. April 28, 1934.
My resignation tendered, because a justification no
longer possible. Long live mediocrity and noise!
. . . My rectorate was based on a great mistake,
namely, my wanting to bring questions into the
temperament and regard of my “colleagues”, ques-
tions from which they were at best excluded,
to their advantage – and undoing. (Heidegger,
2016:119)
Immediately following this passage Heidegger writes the
following, seemingly as a reminder to himself:
Need to remain reticent and hard – distant and
strong entering again into the inmost plight back
into the prompting of the distant injunction. The
1945, as marking a key point in the reorientation of his thinking
after Being and Time.
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great concealed event – the remoteness of every-
thing of today. The proximity to the inmost voca-
tion of the people. (Heidegger, 2016:119)
In turning away from the political, Heidegger turns back
to the absolute primacy of the philosophical, withdrawing
into a form of philosophical solitariness and isolation (part
of which is given physical expression in the rural seclusion
of Todtnauberg; see Heidegger, 1981:27–30), even of philo-
sophical alienation (a standing apart from the superficial and
the mundane), in which the concern with being is given pri-
ority over everything else, including the political.
One might say that the withdrawal at issue here almost
takes the form of an enactment of the ontological difference
itself – an enactment of the difference between being and
mere “things” – but an enactment in which being is set so
far apart from everything else that there is no room for any-
thing other than being. Consequently, the prioritisation that
it enacts is both absolute and exclusive, resulting in an ef-
fective severing of the philosophical from the worldly and
the human and from any ordinary form of politics. This is
strongest in those works in which Heidegger’s personal voice
is most directly in the fore – works like the Notebooks, but
also Contributions – works in which Heidegger often speaks
in a declamatory and almost oracular style. As a result, the
Heidegger of the 1930s and early 1940s readily appears, in
many passages from the Notebooks as well as other works
such as Contributions, like the sole prophet of a new and
apocalyptic religion in which being is the god (see Farin and
Malpas, 2017). It is not merely the focus on being that is im-
portant here, of course, but the particular character of that
focus and the larger context in which it is situated. In the
shift from Being and Time to Contributions, the “there” of
being (Da-sein) is reconceptualised in terms of the “event”
of being (Ereignis) which is itself understood, at least dur-
ing much of the 1930s and 1940s, in direct relation to the
history of being, Seinsgeschichte. This “history” is in turn
associated not only with Heidegger’s developing critique of
modernity – the critique of what he calls, in the 1930s and
1940s, machination (Machenschaft) – but also with ideas of
people (Volk) and nation, and especially of the German peo-
ple. The focus on being – on the history of being, on the
appropriations of being in the destinies of different peoples,
and on the almost complete failure of everyone other than
Heidegger himself to grasp what is at issue here – gives an
extreme and almost obsessive cast to Heidegger’s thinking in
this period. David Farrell Krell has thus said that the Note-
books from 1931 to 1941 are characterised by “the absence
of Heidegger’s best qualities, namely, his ability to focus and
to reflect self-critically, and the presence of his worst, to wit,
his aggressive polemics against everything in the world ex-
cept his own idée fixe” (Krell, 2015, p. 160).4
4In contrast, although writing before the publication of the Note-
books, Slavoj Žižek to some extent argues in favour of the “extrem-
It is against the background of just such extreme think-
ing – thinking that has, in many respects, been pushed to the
edge – that many of the anti-Semitic passages in the Note-
books have to be read. Peter Trawny and Donatella di Cesare
have argued that the Notebooks show that anti-Semitism is
actually at the centre of Heidegger’s thinking, at least in the
1930s and 1940s, and that Heidegger’s is therefore an anti-
Semitic philosophy. Although he accepts Heidegger’s rejec-
tion of any simple biologically based racism, Trawny argues
that Heidegger nevertheless holds to an “onto-historical anti-
Semitism” (Trawny, 2014). Di Cesare sees Heidegger’s anti-
Semitism as expressive of a more pervasive rootedness of
a metaphysical anti-Semitism thinking in German philoso-
phy in general (see, for instance, Di Cesare, 2016). The ev-
idence provided by the Notebooks seems, however, to be in-
adequate to support either of these claims – too much of the
argument of Trawny and di Cesare depends on supposition
that is additional to, and even an exaggeration of, the rela-
tively sparse material contained in the Notebooks themselves
(though di Cesare’s larger claims concerning the anti-Semitic
strands within German philosophy undoubtedly bear further
examination). However, Trawny and di Cesare are correct
just inasmuch as Heidegger’s anti-Semitic comments are in-
deed not a reflection of some personal anti-Semitic leaning
but rather have their contingent origins in Heidegger’s philo-
sophical thinking5 – they arise out of the obsessive attempt
to think being, and only being, and to do so in a way that
also reads the contemporary state of the world in the light of
that obsession, as this is also coloured by Heidegger’s own
personal-historical circumstances. In doing so, Heidegger is
sometimes insightful, but at other times he also seems to fall
victim to convenient caricatures and stereotypes – and not
only those associated with the anti-Semitic.
In this respect, what the Notebooks make most evident
is not any genuinely new element or aspect in Heideg-
ger’s thinking – there are, for the most part, no significant
philosophical ideas in the Notebooks that are not present,
usually in more developed forms, in contemporaneous lec-
tures and essays6 – but rather the underlying tone or tem-
per (Grundstimmung) of that thinking (as Heidegger him-
ity” of Heidegger’s thinking in the 1930s as against the Gelassenheit
of the post-war period (“Beware of Gentle Openness!”) (see Žižek,
2017:95–153, 148–153). Although his reading is an interesting and
provocative one, I would argue that Žižek’s Lacanian predilections
lead to a misreading of Heidegger’s thinking, particularly of the
post-war thinking.
5Although philosophical, there is nothing inevitable about Hei-
degger’s anti-Semitism – it does not follow necessarily from any of
his basic philosophical commitments – hence the emphasis on its
contingent origins.
6This is also a point to which Krell draws attention: “I myself
find very little in these thousand pages that is thought provoking.
They do present a dire view of Heidegger in a dire time, and it is
important that they be made available to the public. Yet, to repeat,
there is precious little here that adds to Heidegger’s more considered
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self says, though with a different sense of what is at issue,
in 1938; see Heidegger, 1997:426). This tone and temper
– especially the extremism and obsessiveness, but also the
declamatory character – is indeed a direct reflection of Hei-
degger’s insistence on the absolute separation of the thinking
of being from any other thinking that might be oriented to-
wards mere things, and the superiority and priority of the for-
mer over the latter (something closely tied, in addition, to the
highly abstract nature of the thinking at issue here). However,
the Notebooks also show how, following the end of the war,
the tone and temper of Heidegger’s thinking changes signif-
icantly, taking on a more subdued and reflective character
in the latter half of the 1940s (though occasionally there are
still outbursts that echo the earlier extremism) and shifting
away from the declamatory, almost oracular, style of the pre-
vious decade or more. It is this different tone and temper, and
different style, that characterises not only the later volumes
of the Notebooks but also Heidegger’s more public writings
from around 1946 onwards – in essays like the “Letter on
‘Humanism”’, from 1946–47, and even more so in volumes
like What is Called Thinking from 1951–52.7 This shift is
itself connected with the emergence in Heidegger’s thinking
of a more explicit concern with place – in Greek topos and
in Heidegger’s German, Ort or Ortschaft.
That place occupies a central role in Heidegger’s thinking
is a claim that has been advanced by a number of thinkers,
perhaps most notably Joseph Fell, Edward Casey, and Reiner
Schürmann, but also Julian Young and Stuart Elden, and it
has also been an important theme in my own work. Place is
not, however, a concept that is explicit in Heidegger through-
out the entirety of his thought. Although it may be argued
to be implicit from the start (and I have myself argued for
just this claim; see Malpas, 2006), the focus on place seems
to become more evident in the period following Heidegger’s
departure from the rectorate in 1934, and to be at its clearest
and most explicit in the work after 1946 (“Building Dwelling
Thinking” being a prime example, see Heidegger, 1971:141–
160). Heidegger comes to refer to the entirety of his thinking
as taking the form of a “topology of being”, but until the pub-
lication of the Notebooks, there were only two clear instances
of that phrase in Heidegger’s published work, the first being
from “The Thinker as Poet” in 19478 and the second from
the Le Thor Seminar in 1969 (see Heidegger, 2004:47) (there
Beiträge and other published works of the 1930s” (Krell, 2015:127–
128).
7See, once again, Krell’s comments after he has pointed to the
stylistic inadequacies of Heidegger’s writing from the 1930s and
1940s: “The situation improves in the 1950s, when Heidegger de-
velops a style all his own. Signs of an independent style doubt-
less appear already in his best writing and thinking of the 1930s,
and it matures in the extraordinary essays of the 1950s, ‘Building
Dwelling Thinking’, ‘Poetically Man Dwells. . . ’, and ‘The Thing”’
(Krell, 2015:160).
8“But poetry that thinks, is in truth the topology of being” (Hei-
degger, 1971:12).
is also a third, though less straightforward, instance in which
topology as a discussion of the place or “locale” of being also
appears – see Heidegger, 1998:311–312). In the Notebooks,
however, and more particularly, in the Remarks from 1946 to
1947, the language of place and topology abounds – and so
we find talk of the topology of being (Topologie des Seyns)
(see Heidegger, 2015:201–202, 434, 512), as well as of the
place of thinking (Ortschaft des Denkens) (see Heidegger,
2015:191), the place of the event (Ortschaft des Ereignisses)
(see Heidegger, 2015:301, 310, 315, 316, 328), and the place
of being (Ortschaft des Seyns) (see Heidegger, 2015:202).
Here the topology of being appears to have replaced the his-
tory of being, and even the ontological difference itself even-
tually recedes into the background (see Heidegger, 2004:60–
61). Thus, again in the Remarks, Heidegger talks of “get-
ting over being” (Verwindung des Seyns), as well as of giv-
ing up philosophy and historiography (Historie) and history
(Geschichte) too (Heidegger, 2015:222–223; see also p. 500).
The explicit turn to place in Heidegger’s thinking, which is
where the reorientation that begins in the early 1930s seems
finally to arrive, and which can be seen so clearly in the Note-
books from the middle to late 1940s (Remarks), is thus also a
shift away from the extremism, isolation, and obsessiveness
of the previous decade or more and towards a renewed sense
of engagement with the unity of the world, the unity of being
and “things”, as is given in and through place.
The reorientation that occurs over the course of the Note-
books is connected not only to Heidegger’s thinking of place
but also to his thinking of technology and modernity. Indeed,
one might argue that this is, in fact, the other key theme that
the Notebooks bring powerfully to the fore. Although there
are indications of Heidegger’s critical stance towards tech-
nology and modernity already in Being and Time,9 this is not
a topic that has any special salience in the earlier work. In the
Notebooks from the 1930s, however, it becomes a recurrent
and central theme, and there can be no doubt that it is impli-
cated in both Heidegger’s engagement with Nazism and his
disengagement from it (as the infamous comment in Intro-
duction to Metaphysics indicates (see Heidegger, 2000:213)
and as the Notebooks themselves confirm). Yet although the
critique of technology that is developed in the 1930s, and
that is especially evident in the Notebooks, is the precursor
to what appears in the essays from the late 1940s and early
1950s (most obviously, “The Question Concerning Technol-
ogy”; see Heidegger, 1977:3–35), it is also clear that the
earlier critique is much cruder and conceptually less artic-
ulate than the later. The talk of machination that abounds
in the Notebooks from the 1930s and into the 1940s dis-
appears in the post-war writings, including the later Note-
9Most notably in the very brief comment on radio: “With the
‘radio’, for example, Dasein has so expanded its everyday environ-
ment that it has accomplished a de-severance of the ‘world’ – a
de-severance which, in its meaning for Dasein, cannot yet be visu-
alised” (Heidegger, 1962:140 [H105]).
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books. Machenschaft, with its etymological connection to
both machen, to make or to do, and to Macht (power), obvi-
ously carries echoes of the Nietzschean will to power (Wille
zur Macht), and the use of the term also indicates how much
of Heidegger’s thinking during the 1930s and early 1940s,
including his opinion of modernity, is bound up with the at-
tempt to come to terms with Nietzsche. However, just as Ni-
etzsche largely disappears from Heidegger’s thinking after
the mid-1940s, so too is Machenschaft not a term that is op-
erative in any of Heidegger’s later discussions of technology
and modernity. Instead, Machenschaft gives way to Gestell,
and what is significant about this latter term is that it carries
a clear topological connotation – as suggested by Andrew
Mitchell’s translation of the term as “positionality” in the En-
glish edition of the Bremen Lectures of 1949 (see Heidegger,
2012).10 Gestell is essentially a mode of spatialised order-
ing and, as such, it is a mode of ordering that obscures the
essential placedness of being, of things, and of the world.11
The shift to topology is thus itself an important element in
Heidegger’s more developed post-war analysis of technology
and modernity – something that should already be evident
from the post-war essays themselves12 and is also demon-
strated by the development of ideas in the pages of the Note-
books.
The shift both from history to place and from Machen-
schaft to Gestell indicates the difference in temper and orien-
tation that occurs over the course of the Notebooks and that
the Notebooks to a large extent allow us to map out. It is a
shift that opens out into the very different thinking that char-
acterises the later Heidegger – a thinking that, even though it
arises out of the earlier and is in some ways continuous with
it, is also very different from it. The real significance of Hei-
degger’s Black Notebooks does not lie, then, in any new or
unprecedented ideas that the Notebooks enunciate or even in
the scandalous pronouncements they may be thought to con-
tain. Instead the Notebooks are important precisely because
of the way they better enable us to understand the develop-
ment of Heidegger’s thinking, in terms of its overall direc-
tion, the dead ends into which it runs, and the dangers that
it encounters. It enables us better to evaluate and position
works like Contributions in relation to Heidegger’s thinking
10The translation is not without its problems, but the topological
connotations that the term Gestell carries are nonetheless significant
– see my discussion in Malpas (2012:97–112).
11See my discussion in Malpas (2006:278–303) and Mal-
pas (2018, chap. 9). In relation to Nietzsche, it is also worth exam-
ining the very last of the works included in Heidegger’s Nietzsche
volumes, “Nihilism as Determined by the History of Being” (see
Heidegger, 1982), in which the language of place – including the
idea of the locale or place of being (see Heidegger, 1982:216–219)
– comes to the fore.
12See “The Thing”, in Heidegger (1971:161–184), which begins
with a discussion of the way modern media technology changes the
character of the near and far.
overall and to see why even Contributions, as with Being and
Time, is a work that Heidegger had to move beyond.
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